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"REAL-WORLD" AND "ACADEMIC" QUESTIONS ABOUT 
"NONMONETARY OBLIGATIONS" UNDER THE 2005 VERSION OF 
365(b) 
DAVID G. EPSTEIN* AND LISA NORMANDt 
McLachlan, 1 Countryman, 2 West brook. 3 More than most areas of bankruptcy 
law, the bankruptcy law of leases and contracts has been influenced by law 
professors.4 McLachlan is generally credited for inventing the bankruptcy law of 
leases and executory contracts; specifically, for drafting section 70(b) of the 
Bankruptcy Act-the predecessor of section 365.5 Countryman's law review articles 
based on work he did for the Commission to Study the Bankruptcy Laws of the 
United States led to the "Countryman definition" of "executory contracts."6 
Additionally, Westbrook's article urging the elimination of the term "executory 
contract" and a clarification of the consequences of rejection shaped the work of the 
National Bankruptcy Review Commission.7 
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money (or their parents' money) pays for his salary and pays for the SMU football team and .... He is 
especially grateful to Lisa Normand, a second year student at Dedman, for her outstanding work on this 
article. 
t Lisa is a second year student at the Dedman School of Law of Southern Methodist University who is still 
interviewing with law firms. Both Lisa and David are very grateful to Laura Justiss and Sharon Magill. They 
are wonderful to work with, and they are wonderfully helpful. 
1 In 1948, Professor McLaughlin of the Harvard Law School faculty became Professor Mclachlan of the 
Harvard Law School faculty "correcting an ancestral error made in Scotland about 1835." See generally J 
Hanna & J. Maclachlan, Cases and Materials on Creditors Rights viii n. I (4th ed. I 951 ). 
2 See generally Andrew L. Kaufman, In Memoriam: Vern Countryman, I 13 HARV. L. REV. 1071 (2000) 
(eulogizing Professor Vern Countryman and discussing his contribution to bankruptcy law). 
3 See generally http://www.utexas.edu/law/faculty (link to Professor Westbrook's biography, detailing his 
career and achievements in bankruptcy). 
4 There are, of course, other professors and other professionals who have contributed significantly to the 
development of the bankruptcy law relating to leases and executory contracts. For example, the articles of St. 
John's own Professor Robert Zinman make the problems of landlord bankruptcy understandable. See, e.g., 
John J. Creedon & Robert M. Zinman, Landlord Bankruptcy: Laissez Les Lessees, 26 Bus. LAW. 1391 
(1971); Robert M. Zinman, Precision in Statutory Drafting: The Qualitech Quagmire and the Sad History of 
the Bankruptcy Code, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 97 (2004). 
5 See generally James McLaughlin, Amendment of the Bankruptcy Act, 40 HARV. L. REV. 583 (I 927) 
(proposing idea encompassed in Section 70(b) of Chandler Act). 
6 See, e.g., In re Godsey, 323 B.R. 831, 833 n.I (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2005) (adopting Professor 
Countryman's definition ofexecutory contracts); Ready Prods., Inc. v. Jarvis (Jn re Jarvis), Nos. 04-10806, 
04-01097, 2005 WL 758805, at *4-*5 (Bankr. N.H. Mar. 28, 2005) (finding contracts at issue not executory 
under Country man definition). 
7 See generally David G. Epstein & Steve H. Nickles, The National Bankruptcy Review Commission's 
Section 365 Recommendations and the Larger Conceptual Issues, 102 DICK. L. REV. 679, 683-84 (1998) 
(emphasizing Westbrook's influence on National Bankruptcy Review Commission's work on executory 
contracts). 
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Unfortunately, Congress, in amending section 365(b) in 2005, ignored the work 
for the National Bankruptcy Review Commission.8 And Mclachlan. And 
Countryman. And Westbrook.9 While newly revised section 365(b) can fairly be 
described as a "piece of work," 10 it can not be blamed on the work of law 
professors. 
I. WHERE ARE WE Now? 
As a part of the 2005 bankruptcy legislation, Congress added language dealing 
with "nonmonetary obligations" 11 to section 365(b): 12 
365. Executory contracts and unexpired leases 
(b )( 1) If there has been a default in an executory contract or 
unexpired lease of the debtor, the trustee may not assume such 
contract or lease unless, at the time of assumption of such contract 
or lease, the trustee-
(A) cures, or provides adequate assurance that the trustee 
will promptly cure, such default other than a default that is 
a breach of a provision relating to the satisfaction of any 
8 Congress did not ignore all of the work of the National Bankruptcy Review Commission. For example, 
the small business provisions reflect the Commission's work. Compare Commission's recommendations, 
found in National Bankruptcy Review Commission Final Report, Bankruptcy: The Next Twenty Years 635-
38 (Oct. 20, 1997), with Subtitle B of Title IV of the 2005 legislation, found at Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8 § 431, 119 Stat. 23, I 09-10 (2005) 
(incorporating recommendations of the Commission). 
9 Happily, Congress did not ignore Jay Westbrook's work on cross border cases. See generally Jay 
Westbrook, Chapter i 5 and Discharge, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 503 (2005). 
10 See, e.g., Brown v. Coombe, No. 96-CV-46, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12950, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 
1996) (illustrating use of expression "piece of work"). J.P. Brown brought suit against the Commissioner of 
the NYS Dept. of Correctional Services along with various mental health professionals. id. at *1-*2. Brown 
alleged that she was ridiculed by her primary therapist, who stated within earshot of inmates and staff, "Lets 
get this right. You believe you (sic) a woman in a man's body who likes or prefers woman sexually? Great! 
A lesbian trapped in a man's body, you're definitely a piece of work." id. at *2 (emphasis added) (Did you 
ever notice that the word "therapist" has the same letters as the words "the rapist"?). 
11 The phrase "nonmonetary obligations" is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code. In her article, Bankruptcy 
Reform and Nonmonetary Defaults-What Have They Done Now? 24-6 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 6 (2005), Risa 
Lynn Wolf-Smith, a bankruptcy partner in the Denver office of Holland & Hart, suggests the following 
examples of what might constitute nonmonetary defaults: "Breaches such as the failure to maintain 
certifications or licenses, to maintain specified quality or qualification standards, to provide information and 
to operate continuously without closure .... " 
12 Language was also added to section 1124 (2)(A)(D). See generally Alan N. Resnick & Henry J Sommer, 
The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005: A Section-by-Section Analysis, in 
THE BANKRUPTCY ABUSE PREVENTION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 2005: WITH ANALYSIS 15 
(2005) ("Similar kinds of provisions on the obligation to cure nonmonetary defaults are added to section 
1124(2) with respect to the impairment of a class of claims."). 
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provision (other than a penalty rate or penalty provision) 
relating to a default arising from any failure to perform 
nonmonetary obligations under an unexpired lease of real 
property, if it is impossible for the trustee to cure such 
default by performing nonmonetary acts at and after the 
time of assumption, except that if such default arises from a 
failure to operate in accordance with a nonresidential real 
property lease, then such default shall be cured by 
performance at and after the time of assumption in 
accordance with such lease, and pecuniary losses resulting 
from such default shall be compensated in accordance with 
the provisions of this paragraph; 
(B) compensates, or provides adequate assurance that the 
trustee will promptly compensate, a party other than the 
debtor to such contract or lease, for any actual pecuniary 
loss to such party resulting from such default; and 
(C) provides adequate assurance of future performance 
under such contract or lease. 
(2) Paragraph (1) of this subsection does not apply to a default that 
is a breach of a provision relating to--
(D) the satisfaction of any penalty rate or penalty provision 
relating to default arising from any failure by the debtor to 
perform nonmonetary obligations under the executory 
contract or unexpired lease. 13 
619 
As Judge Posner wrote in Matter of Handy-Andy Home Improvement Centers, 
Inc.: 14 "Statutory language, like other language, should be read in context. The 
context consists not merely of other sentences but also of the real-world situations 
to which the language pertains . . . . When context is disregarded, silliness 
results." 15 How would you use the statutory provisions set out above to answer the 
following questions about "real-world situations" to which section 365(b) pertains? 
#1: T leases a building from L. The lease provides for monthly rental payments 
of $10,000 by the tenth of the month, with an additional charge of $100 a day for 
13 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 328, 119 
Stat. 23, 100 (2005) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)). 
14 144 F.3d 1125 (7th Cir. 1998). 
15 Id. at 1128. 
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each day that the payment is late. T does not make a rental payment on January 10. 
Instead, D files a bankruptcy petition on January 15. T wants to assume the lease; 
What result under section 365? 
#2: T leases a building from L. The terms of the lease make "going dark" 16 for 
more than 72 hours an event of default. Shortly before filing its 11 petition, T 
stopped all business operations for 5 days. T wants to assume the lease. What 
result under section 365? 
#3: D is a franchisee of F. The franchise agreement makes "going dark" for 
more than 72 hours an event of default. Shortly before filing its 11 petition, D 
stopped all business operations for 5 days, D wants to assume the franchise 
agreement. What result under section 365? 
#4: D rents equipment from 0. The lease requires that D obtains and maintains 
insurance on the equipment, and the lease contains a definition of default which 
includes "failure to keep the equipment insured at all times." D let the insurance 
lapse for two months. Fortunately nothing happened to the equipment during that 
period, and D was able to insure the equipment again before filing for bankruptcy. 
D wants to assume the lease. What result under section 365? 
#5: D buys equipment from 0 on credit. 0 retains a security interest in the 
equipment. The security agreement requires that D obtain and maintain insurance 
on the equipment and contains a definition of default which includes "failure to 
keep the equipment insured at all times." D let the insurance lapse for two months. 
Fortunately nothing happened to the equipment during that period, and D was able 
to insure the equipment before filing for bankruptcy. D wants to keep the 
equipment. What result under section 365(b )? 
#6: L, a moyl, 17 rents his house in a Jewish neighborhood to T. Because L's 
work comes from other religious Jews, the lease expressly provides that T is not to 
hang Christmas decorations in visible places. Nonetheless, T hangs Christmas 
decorations in visible places. T files for bankruptcy. T wants to assume the house 
lease. What result under section 365(b )? 
[We understand that this sixth question is unrealistic-"academic" not "real-
world" but (1) your senior, "academic" author is somewhat defensive about teaching 
at a school named Southern METHODIST18 and wanted to be the first to use the 
16 A "going dark" or continuous operation clause in a lease prohibits the cessation of operations of a tenant 
at the specified premises. See Jn re Ground Round, Inc., No. 04-11235-WCH, 2004 WL 1732207, at *7 
(Bankr. D. Mass July 12, 2004) (noting "any continuous operations provision or 'going dark' clause, or 
similar clause prohibiting the cessation of operations at the leased premises is unenforceable against the 
assignee thereof under Section 365(f)"). 
17 See MOYL: THE STUDY OF A TRAVELING JEWISH RITUAL CIRCUMCISER (National Film Network 2004) 
(tracking moyl's visits from family to family performing ritual circumcisions). 
18 With the possible exception of "Jewleeard" which Kyle briefly attended, South Park: The Biggest 
Douche in the Universe (Comedy Central television broadcast Nov. 27, 2002), Jews are more subtle about 
naming their schools. There is a "Southern Methodist University," but not a "Northern Jewish University," a 
"Texas Christian University" but not a "New York Jewish University." Everyone knows that Cardozo and 
Emory are "Jewish" law schools but you don't see the word "Jewish" in their school names. 
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yiddish word "moyl" in a law review article 19 and (2) neither of us could come up 
with a realistic situation involving breach of a nonmonetary obligation in a 
residential lease. In a sense, all six of the questions are "academic" because what 
will actually happen in most "real-world" bankruptcy cases is that the non-debtor 
party and the debtor will resolve the matter consensually and section 365, at most, 
will be a factor in the negotiations.] 
A. Penalty Rate or Penalty Provisions in Commercial Real Estate Leases 
In question #1, there has been a default, so section 365(b) applies. The default 
does not relate to a "nonmonetary obligation," so the 2005 addition to section 
365(b)(l)(A) does not apply. To assume the lease, Tis going to have to meet the 
requirements of section 365(b )(1 ): (A) cure, (B) compensate, and (C) provide 
adequate assurance. 
A possible litigable issue is whether the $100 a day late fee is covered by 
section 365(b )(1 )(B) as compensation for an "actual pecuniary loss" or covered by 
section 365(b )(2)(D) as a "penalty rate or penalty provision." While the questions in 
any such litigation would be primarily fact questions, there are two possible 
questions of law. First, in applying section 365(b)(l)(B) to question #1, could a 
court find that while $100 a day is not the right amount to compensate L for "actual 
pecuniary loss" resulting from late payment, there is an amount that T must pay? 
Second, in applying section 365(b)(2) to question #2, could a court find that section 
365(b)(2) does not apply because (I) section 365(b)(2) only applies to a "default that 
is a breach of a provision relating to the satisfaction of any penalty rate or penalty 
provision," (II) T's default was a failure to pay rent by the I 51h of the month as 
required by the lease, and (III) a lease provision requiring payment by the l51h of the 
month is not "a provision relating to the satisfaction of [a] penalty rate or penalty 
provision?" 
B. Nonmonetary Obligations in Commercial Real Estate Leases 
Question #2 involves a nonmonetary obligation in a commercial real estate 
lease. In the new language of section 365(b )(1 )(A), closing restaurant operations 
was a "default [that] arises from a failure to operate in accordance with a 
nonresidential real property lease." 
While Question #2 unquestionably comes within the language of section 
365(b)(l)(A), there are three questions that might be raised in applying that 
language. 
19 Regrettably, we are not the first to use "moyl" in a law review article. Professor Wayne Lafave used (or 
misused) "moyl" in Wayne Lafave, What ls A Kamisar? 102 MICH. L. REV. 1732, 1734 n.4 (2004) ("he has 
a puter-wouldn't-melt-in-his-moy/ look on his punim"). 
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First, what does the last clause of new section 365(b )(1 )(A)-"pecuniary losses 
... shall be compensated in accordance with the provisions of this paragraph"-add 
to the language of section 365(b )(I )(B)-"any actual pecuniary loss to such party 
resulting from such default?"20 The relevant statutory structure is section, 
subsection, paragraph, and subparagraph. In this example, that is 365, 365(b ), 
365(b )(1) and 365 (b )(1 )(A),(B), and ( c ). The conjunction connecting the 
subparagraphs is "and." If section 365(b )(1 )(A) "cure" applies, then section 
365(b)(l)(B) "compensation" always applies. And yet, the new, last clause of 
section 365(b )(1 )(A) seems to be saying nothing more than (B) compensation 
applies.21 (Unless it is important that section 365(b)(l)(B) uses the phrase "actual 
pecuniary loss to such party" and section 365(b )(I )(A) uses the phrase "pecuniary 
losses."22 But we can't figure out23 how that could be important. More specifically, 
we can't "figure out" how a court could figure out losses that are not "actual." And, 
we can't figure out how a court could "figure out" some one other than "such party" 
who would have "pecuniary losses.") 
Second, if this last clause of section 365(b )(1 )(A)-"except that if such default 
arises from a failure to operate in accordance with a nonresidential real property 
lease, then ... pecuniary losses resulting from such default shall be compensated in 
accordance with the provisions of this paragraph"-creates a payment obligation 
that is different from the payment obligation of section 365(b )(1 ), then some facts 
may present a question as to whether the default "arises from a failure to operate." 
Question #2 involving "going dark" in violation of a lease provision requiring 
"continuous operations" is an obvious example of a "default arising from failure to 
operate in accordance with a nonresidential real property lease." We cannot come 
20 See Brief for Appellee and Cross-Appellant at 4, Worthington v. Gen. Motors Corp. (Jn re Claremont 
Acquisition Corp.), 113 F.3d 1029 (9th Cir. 1997) ("Section 365(b)(l)(B) already deals with the cure of 
monetary defaults (i.e., compensation for "any pecuniary loss"). Section 365(b)(l)(A) cannot be similarly 
limited to pecuniary damages."). 
21 Cf Daniel A. Lowenthal, Revisions to Bankruptcy Code Sections 365 and 366, THE BANKR. 
STRATEGIST, Apr.-May 2005, at 6: 
[W]ith respect specifically to nonresidential real property leases, if the default arises 
from a debtor's "failure to operate in accordance" with the lease, then such default will 
need to be cured at and after the time of assumption. Moreover, a landlord will be 
entitled to compensation, as required by section 365(b)(l)(B), for pecuniary losses 
resulting from such default. 
Id. But cf Risa Lynn Wolf-Smith, Bankruptcy Reform and Nonmonetary Defaults-What Have They Done 
Now?, 24-6 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 6 ("nonresidential real property leases are singled out for special 
treatment"). 
22 This is of course a sentence fragment. Lisa was (and is) reluctant to have her name on an article with 
sentence fragments. For more substantive information about "actual pecuniary loss" and section 
365(b)(l)(B) see generally Jo Ann J. Brighton, Curing Defaults Prompt Cure May Not Be as Prompt as You 
Think, 22-3 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 16 (2003) (noting § 365(b)(l )(B) "speaks to the consequences" of default). 
23 And Lisa was reluctant to have her name on an article with the phrase "figure out" until we did a 
Westlaw search in the "JLR" data base and got 8897 "hits" for "figure out." 
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up with an equally obvious example of a default, that is both (I) not excluded by 
section 365(b )(2) and (II) not arising from a failure to operate in accordance with a 
nonresidential real property lease except perhaps multiple leases with cross-default 
. . 24 provisions. 
Third, does this language or any other language of section 365(b )(1) apply if the 
default was not "material?" The question of materiality becomes more material in 
an executory contract question like Question #3 or an equipment lease question like 
Question #4. 
C. Nonmonetary Obligations in Executory Contracts 
In Question #3 involving the franchisee's default, there is no question that the 
new language added in section 365(b)(l)(A) is inapplicable-not an "unexpired 
lease of real property." And, there is no longer any question whether the language 
of section 365(b )(2)(D) applies-not a "penalty provision." Nor is there any longer 
any question about whether Congress contemplates that there are incurable defaults 
that prevent a debtor from assuming executory contracts. 25 
Language in cases and legislative history suggest a couple of possible litigable 
questions. 
First, materiality: was temporarily closing business operations a "material" 
default? Even though the word "material" does not appear in any of the various 
24 See generally William P. Weintraub, Historical Defaults and Cross Defaults: Here a Default, There A 
Default, Everywhere a Default, Default, Default, 26 CAL. BANKR. J. 286, 294-98 (2003) (examining 
enforceability of cross-default provisions in multiple leases). 
25 Prior to the 2005 legislation, professors and practitioners questioned (I) whether incurable defaults had 
to be cured and (2) whether any default was incurable. In his 1997 student text, Professor Charles Jordan 
Tabb discussed the first of the questions: 
Nothing in the Code answers the Delphic inquiry of whether a trustee is required to 
cure even an incurable default before assuming. If so, that contract would be 
unassumable because the trustee would be unable to comply with all of the predicates 
to assumption .... Yet, in order to preserve a valuable contract for the estate, a court 
might read the "cure" requirement as applying only to the realm of the possible, and 
allow assumption if the trustee could compensate the non-debtor party for its damages 
suffered because of the default, and give adequate assurance of future performance. 
CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 615 ( 1997). 
In a short article published shortly before the 2005 legislation, Professor Tabb's University of Illinois 
colleague and casebook co-author, Professor Ralph Brubaker addressed the second of the questions and 
made a persuasive argument, based on contract law principles, that "[t]he notion that most (if not all) 
nonmonetary defaults are incurable is therefore misguided." Ralph Brubaker, Cure of Nonmonetary Defaults 
as a Prerequisite to Assumption of Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases: A Lesson in the Nature and 
Function of the Cure Requirement, BANKR. L. LETTER, Dec. 2004, at 8; see also James J. Stang, Assumption 
of Contracts and Leases: The Obstacle of the Historical Default, 24 CAL. BANKR. J. 39, 42 (1998) 
(reviewing cases both permitting and refusing to allow debtor to cure nonmonetary defaults). 
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versions of section 365, there is support in case law and secondary authorities for 
applying section 365(b) only to "material" defaults.26 
Second: did L waive the default? By changing "shortly before filing its eleven 
petition" to "eleven months before filing its eleven petition," it is not hard to 
envision a court's concluding that D's post-default/pre-bankruptcy actions and F's 
post-default/pre-bankruptcy inaction, constituted waiver of the defaults so that there 
were no defaults and no basis for looking to section 365(b ). 
D. Nonmonetary Obligations in Equipment Leases 
In the 2005 amendments to section 365(b) dealing with nonmonetary 
obligations, Congress made the "conscious choice"27 to treat equipment leases like 
executory contracts and not like real estate leases. Congress made the conscious 
choice that debtors could be barred from assuming executory contracts and 
equipment leases because of pre-bankruptcy nonmonetary defaults that cannot be 
cured. 
Accordingly, all of the material in C above relating to assumption of the 
franchise agreement in question #3 applies to the assumption of the equipment lease 
in question #4. Especially the material about materiality. 
E. Nonmonetary Obligations in Equipment Financings 
The default in question # 5 is the same as in question #4. In both questions, the 
default was the lapse in insurance. Additionally, in both questions, there was no 
"actual pecuniary loss" resulting from the lapse. The difference between question 
#5 and question #4 is that question #5 is an equipment secured financing transaction 
governed by sections 1123 et seq. and question #4 is an equipment lease governed 
by section 365. That is an important difference. 
Notwithstanding our question at the end of #5, in any equipment secured 
financing question there is no section 365(b) question.28 Section 365(b) does not 
26 E.g., In re Windmill Farms, Inc., 841 F.2d 1467, 1473 (9th Cir. 1988) ("[T]he bankruptcy court found 
that the alleged nonmonetary defaults were not of sufficient substance to preclude assumption of the lease. 
This finding is not clearly erroneous."); In re Whitsett, 163 B.R. 752, 754 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1994) ("[l]t is 
clear that a bankruptcy court has 'some latitude' in determining whether provisions in a debtor-tenant's lease 
may be deemed waived and their compliance be deemed insignificant in the assumption process. The 
determining factor appears to be the 'materiality' of the default in issue." (citing In re Joshua Slocum, Ltd., 
922 F. 2d 1081, 1090-92 (3d. Cir. 1990))); Ralph Brubaker, Cure of Nonmonetary Defaults as a 
Prerequisite to Assumption of Executory Contracts ·and Unexpired Leases: A Lesson in the Nature and 
Function of Cure Requirement, 24 BANKR. L. LEITER No. 12, Dec. 2004, at 7 ("[T]he concept of the 'cure' 
of defaults, by its very nature, is a material breach concept .... "). 
27 Arguably the use of the phrase "conscious choice" to describe Congressional action in the bankruptcy 
area may be something of an oxymoron, albeit not on the top fifty oxymoron list. See generally 
httg://www.tnellen.com/cybereng/lit_terms/oxymoron.html (listing top fifty most-used oxymorons). 
This article is limited to section 365(b) "nonmonetary obligation" questions. There is a possible question 
as to whether changes in how section 365(b) default provisions operate should affect how the default 
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apply to an equipment secured financing-unless the transaction was merely an 
equipment secured financing in form, but an equipment lease in substance. 
Question #5, as stated, is the "academic" or "man bites dog" version of the 
question. The "real-world" question arises when a transaction is an equipment lease 
in form and equipment secured financing in substance. 
While the law is clear that a transaction that is an equipment lease in form but a 
secured equipment financing in substance is to be treated like a secured equipment 
financing, it is often not clear whether a transaction that is a lease in form is in fact 
a lease in substance.29 By barring debtors from retaining leased equipment because 
of a nonmonetary, non-curable, pre-bankruptcy default, Congress has made the 
unclear question of whether an equipment deal is a lease or a secured financing [and 
the equally unclear question of whether a real estate deal is a lease or a secured 
financing30] even more important. 
F. Nonmonetary Obligations in Residential Real Estate Leases 
The last question, question #6, raises no question about the applicability of the 
2005 language in section 365(b )( 1 )(A). It applies. Whatever the phrase "breach of 
a provision relating to the satisfaction of any provision . . . relating to a default 
arising from any failure to perform nonmonetary obligations under an unexpired 
lease of real property" means, T's displaying Christmas decorations in question #6 
comes within that meaning. And, it is impossible for T to "cure such default by 
performing nonmonetary acts." 
Whether it would be possible for T to cure the default by paying L for "actual 
pecuniary losses resulting from such default" is a moot question. A question made 
prov1s1on in section l 123(a)(5)(G) ("curing or waiving of any default") or in newly-amended section 
I 124(2)(A) should operate, but that is another article (someone else's article). 
29 E.g., In re Pillowtex, Inc., 349 F.3d 711, 717-18 (3d Cir. 2003) (finding petitioner's energy-saving 
equipment lease was secured financing transaction under New York Uniform Commercial Code); In re 
Bailey, 326 B.R. 156, 162-65 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 2005) (explaining debtor's tractor lease was secured 
financing transaction under Missouri Uniform Commercial Code and lease's termination clause). 
30 See United Airlines, Inc. v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 416 F.3d 609, 613-14 (7th Cir. 2005): 
Id. 
No legally sophisticated person writing in 1978 could have thought that the word 
"lease" in a text that distinguishes between current consumption (which must be paid 
for in full) and secured debt (which may be written down to ease financial distress) 
means any transaction in the form of a lease. The need to look through form to 
substance would be apparent not only from the structure of the statute but also from the 
fact that many of the leased assets would be covered directly by the UCC. Section 365 
in particular deals with leases of both personal and real property; it would not be 
sensible to read the same word as referring to substance when dealing with personal 
property and form when dealing with real property. The statute thus must refer to 
substance throughout section 365. Nothing else respects both the structure of the 
Bankruptcy Code and the way the legal community understood the distinction between 
leases and security agreements in the 1970s. 
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moot by not only the word "nonmonetary" in section 365(b)(l)(A) but also by the 
words in section 365(b)(l)(B). If payments by T to L for "actual pecuniary loss" 
could affect a cure in (A), then wouldn't (B) which requires payment for pecuniary 
loss be surplusage?31 
More generally, reading the language of section 365(b)(l)(A) in the context of 
both "other sentences," i.e., section 365(b)(l)(B) and section 365(b)(l)(C) and "the 
real-world situation[s] to which the statutory language applies", i.e., questions #1-
#4, suggests that in most real-world situations most of the new language of section 
365(b)(l)(A) will not add any new obligations to the obligations imposed already 
imposed by section 365(b )(1 )(B) and section 365(b )(1 )(C). In "real-world 
situations" the most important language in new section 365(b )( l )(A) is the language 
that is not in section 365(b )(l )(A). Specifically, there is no language permitting 
debtors to assume and assign equipment leases and franchise agreements and 
intellectual property licenses and other executory contracts notwithstanding some 
"historical default" by compensating the non-debtor party for "pecuniary losses 
resulting from such default." 
II. How DID WE GET TO WHERE WE ARE Now? 
The predecessor to section 365, section 70b32 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 as 
amended, did not expressly require cure of defaults in order to assume leases or 
executory contracts. The Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States 
drafted a new Bankruptcy Act (of 1973) which it submitted and recommended to 
Congress for enactment.33 Section 4-602(b)(2) of the Commission's proposed law 
expressly required past defaults be cured in order to assume a lease.34 While the law 
enacted by Congress in 1978 differs significantly from the law proposed by the 
Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, section 365 retained the 
Commission's express requirement of cure of defaults. 
31 In bankruptcy litigation, the word "superfluous" seems to be preferred to "surplusage." See Worthington 
v. Gen. Motors Corp. (In re Claremont Acquisition Corp.), 113 F.3d 1029, 1034 (9th Cir. 1997) ("[I]f 
subsection (D) is a catch-all provision ... then subsections (A) through (C) of§ 365(b)(2) would be 
superfluous, as they would be encompassed by subsection (D)."); Beckett v. Coatesville Hous. Assocs., No. 
CIV. A. 00-5337, 2001 WL 767601, at *5 (E.D. Pa. July 5, 2001) ("If Congress intended that all 
nonmonetary defaults be incurable under section 365, section 365(b)(2) would be rendered superfluous. As 
such, I conclude that Congress intended section 365 to apply to both monetary and nonmonetary defaults."). 
32 S. Doc. No. 225, 75th Cong. 3d Sess., at 90, 52 Stat. 840, 880 (1938). 
33 Communication from the Executive Director, Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States 
Transmitting A Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, H.R. Doc. No. 93-
137, pt. I, (1937), reprinted in BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 1978, VOL. 2, Doc. 21 (Alan A. Resnick & 
Eugene M. Wypyski eds., William S. Hein & Co., Inc. 1979) (summarizing recommendations of Bankruptcy 
Commission). 
34 Communication from the Executive Director, Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States 
Transmitting A Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, H.R. Doc. No. 93-
137, pt. 2, at 152-3. 
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More specifically, in the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, section 365(b)(l)(A) 
established a general cure of defaults requirement for assumption of leases or 
executory contracts, and section 365(b )(2) created three exceptions to that 
requirement. A trustee was not required to cure a default that is a breach of a 
provision relating to: 
(A) the insolvency or financial condition of the debtor at any time 
before the closing of the case; 
(B) the commencement of a case under this title; 
(C) the appointment of or taking possession by a trustee in a case 
under this title or a custodian before such commencement.35 
These exceptions (together with section 365(e) and (f)) changed the law 
significantly. Under the 1898 Act, a provision terminating a lease or contract when 
one of the parties filed for bankruptcy-an ipso facto clause36-prevented the 
assumption of the lease or contract in bankruptcy.37 
In 1994, Congress added another exception, which became the source of much 
confusion in bankruptcy cases and led to a circuit split in its interpretation.38 Under 
the newly added section 365(b)(2)(D), trustees would not be required to cure a 
"default that is a breach of a provision relating to ... the satisfaction of any penalty 
rate or provision relating to a default arising from any failure by the debtor to 
perform nonmonetary obligations under the executory contract or unexpired 
lease."39 
The reported legislative history on this provision is very limited. There is 
simply a statement in a House Report that section 365(b )(2)(D) was added "to 
provide that when sought by a debtor, a lease can be cured at a non-default rate (i.e., 
it would not need to pay penalty rates). 1140 
The confusion over section 365(b )(2)(D) soon arose in the 1995 district court 
case Ford Motor Co. v. Claremont Acquisition Corp. (In re Claremont Acquisition 
35 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(2)(a)-(c) (1978). 
36 Richard I. Aaron, Hooray for Gibberish! A Glossary of Bankruptcy Slang for the Occasional 
Practitioner or a Befuddled Judge, 3 DEPAUL Bus & COM. L.J., 141, 157 (2005) (defining an "ipso facto" 
clause as a "contract provision automatically terminating the contract upon bankruptcy or insolvency 
proceeding ofa party). 
37 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY "if 365.07, at 365--68 (Lawrence P. King et al. eds., 15th ed. Rev. 1997) 
("Under the former Bankruptcy Act ... an ipso facto clause that terminated the lease upon the bankruptcy of 
a party was enforceable."). 
38 Compare Worthington v. Gen. Motors Corp. (Jn re Claremont Acquisition Corp.), 113 F.3d 1029, 1035 
(9th Cir. 1997) (holding Congress did not intend for 11 U.S.C. section 365(b)(2)(D) to permit debtors to 
assume unexpired lease or executory contract without first curing nonmonetary defaults), with Eagle Ins. Co. 
v. Bankvest Capital Corp. (Jn re Bankvest Capital Corp.), 360 F.3d 291, 301 (!st Cir. 2004) (holding 
Congress did intend for 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(2)(D) to permit debtors to assume unexpired lease or executory 
contract without first curing nonmonetary defaults). 
39 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(2)(D) (1994). 
40 H.R. REP. No. 103-835 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340, 3359. 
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Corp/ 1 involving franchise agreements between car dealership operators and 
automobile manufacturers under which the operators could only cease operating for 
seven consecutive days.42 In opposing the operators' assignment of the franchise to 
a third party because the operators' failed to operate for about thirteen days before 
filing bankruptcy, the manufacturers argued that section 365(b )(D) only excused 
"the payment of penalties that a debtor would be required to pay as a result of a pre-
petition breach"43-that it did not operate to excuse the trustee from curing 
nonmonetary defaults; it only excused them from paying penalties associated with 
such a default.44 They argued that since the failure to operate for more than seven 
days was an incurable default, the operators could not assign the franchise.45 The 
district court, however, held that "the most natural reading [of section 365(b)(2)(D)] 
supports the interpretation ... that a trustee or debtor in possession is not required 
to cure nonmonetary defaults in order to assume or assign executory contracts and 
leases. "46 It found that the word "penalty" only modified the word "rate" and not the 
phrase "provision relating to a default arising from any failure by the debtor to 
perform nonmonetary obligations under the executory contract or unexpired 
lease."47 Therefore, according to the district court, section 365(b)(2)(D) described 
two separate exceptions to the requirements of section 365(b)(l): one for defaults 
relating to failure to satisfy penalty rates and one for defaults relating to failure to 
satisfy nonmonetary obligations.48 
The first attempt by Congress to clarify the meaning of section 365(b )(2)(D) 
and the requirement of a trustee to cure nonmonetary defaults before assumption 
came in 1997. Two bills, H.R. 120 and H.R. 764, referred to and debated 
collectively as the Hyde-Conyers Amendments,49 contained identical provisions 
amending section 365(b). The proposed bills struck subsection (D) and added new 
subsections (D) and (E) so that section 365(b)(2) would read as follows: 
Paragraph (1) of this subsection does not apply to a default that is a 
breach of a provision relating to--
41 186 B.R. 977 (C.D. Cal. I 995). 
42 Id. at 989. 
43 Id. at 989-90. 
44 See id. at 990. 
45 Id. at 989-990. 
46 Id. at 990. 
47 Id. 
48 See id. 
49 See Bankruptcy Law Technical Corrections Act of 1997, H.R. 120, 105th Cong. (1997) (in.troduced by 
Rep. Conyers on Jan. 7, 1997); Bankruptcy Amendments of 1997, H.R. 764, 105th Cong. (1997) (introduced 
by Rep. Hyde on Feb. 13, 1997). 
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(D) the satisfaction of any penalty rate in an executory contract or 
unexpired lease; or 
(E) the satisfaction of any provision relating to a default arising 
from any failure by the debtor to perform nonmonetary obligations 
under any executory contract or unexpired lease other than an 
unexpired lease of personal property. 50 
629 
Representative Conyers stated that the provision amending section 365(b) was 
intended to "make it clear that subsection (b)(2)(D), providing an exception to the 
obligations which must be cured in order for the trustee to assume a lease, covers 
penalty rates as well as penalty provisions, thereby overruling In re Claremont 
Acquisition Corp., 186 B.R. 977, 990 (C.D. Cal. 1995)."51 
Despite this evidence of legislative intent, subcommittee hearings suggest this 
new language was still ambiguous. One bankruptcy law expert testifying before the 
House Judiciary Committee stated that the new provision clarified that "penalty" 
was never meant to modify "nonmonetary obligations" and that it, therefore, 
excused the cure of nonmonetary obligations.52 Another bankruptcy law expert, 
speaking on the same provision to the same Committee, stated that it sought to 
clarify that "penalty" was intended to modify both "rates" and "provisions," thereby 
allowing a trustee to assume a contract without curing penalty provisions, not 
nonmonetary obligations. 53 
After both witnesses testified, Representative Conyers added that new 
subparagraph (E) was intended to "clarify that nonmonetary lease obligations need 
not be cured whether or not they involve penalties, [thereby codifying the district 
court's opinion in] In re Claremont Acquisition Corp., except ... with respect [to] 
unexpired leases of personal property."54 Thus, the provision was intended to 
overrule Claremont to the extent that the district court interpreted section 
365(b)(2)(D) to mean that all nonmonetary defaults were excused from the 
requirement of cure. But the amendment added subsection (E) to codify the court's 
holding that defaults of nonmonetary obligations need not be cured, unless it is a 
personal property lease. 
In those same hearings, a representative from the Equipment Leasing 
Association ("ELA") was heard on the subject of curing nonmonetary defaults of 
50 H.R. 120, § 11; H.R. 764, § 6. 
51 143 CONG. REC. E21(1997). 
52 Bankruptcy Amendments of 1997; and the Bankruptcy Law Technical Corrections Act of 1997: Hearing 
on H.R. 120 and H.R. 764 Before the Subomm. on Commerical and Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 105th Cong. 37 (1997) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Kenneth N. Klee, Chairman, 
Committee on Legislation, National Bankruptcy Conference). 
53 Id. at 51 (prepared statement of Roger M. Whelan, Chairman, Legislative Committee, American 
Bankruptcy Institute). 
54 Id. at 128 (prepared statement of Rep. Conyers). 
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personal property leases.55 The ELA supported the Hyde-Conyers Amendments 
because of the language in proposed subsection (E) excluding personal property 
leases from the exception to the requirement to cure. 56 The ELA was worried that if 
the amendments did not pass, the district court's holding in Claremont would be 
applied to personal property leases. 57 The ELA complained that applying Claremont 
to personal property leases violated the spirit of compromise of the 1994 
amendments, whereby section 365(b)(2)(0) was included as a quid pro quo for the 
adoption of section 365( d)(l 0). 58 That is, the ELA supported section 
365(b )(2)(0)-which it was told "was limited solely to penalty rates and penalty 
provisions"-in exchange for the obligations imposed on the debtor by the inclusion 
of section 365( d)( 10), which "requir[ ed] debtors to fulfill all obligations (monetary 
and nonmonetary), under an unexpired personal property lease, starting 60 days 
after the filing. "59 
Further, the ELA contended the House was right to exclude personal property 
leases from the operation of proposed subsection (E) because personal property 
leases "are of shorter duration and involve rapid depreciation versus real estate 
leases. 1160 The ELA argued that by including section 365( d)( 10) along with section 
365(b)(2)(0) in the 1994 amendments, Congress attempted to codify the differences 
between real estate and personal property leases.61 And the district court's holding 
in Claremont threatened to undermine that distinction. Therefore, the Hyde-
Conyers amendments were technical and not substantive in nature, and they were 
needed to "fulfill congressional intent by clarifying that a trustee does not have to 
satisfy a penalty rate or penalty provisions prior to assuming an unexpired lease of 
personal property, but does have to cure a default of nonmonetary obligations 
before it may assume. "62 
During the same hearings, a representative from the American Bankers 
Association ("ABA")' also stated support of the Hyde-Conyers Amendments.63 The 
ABA supported the changes that clarified that penalty provisions in executory 
contracts and leases are exempted from the requirement that all defaults must be 
cured before assumption.64 It noted with approval that the amendments "reverse 
55 Id. at 113-18 (statement of Richard R. Gerken, Vice President and Associate General Counsel, 
Comdisco, Inc., on behalf of the Equipment Leasing Association). 
56 Id. at 113. 
57 Id. at 114. 
58 Id. at 116. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 114. 
61 Id. at 115. 
62 Id. at 113. 
63 Id. at 122 (prepared statement of Jill M. Sturtevant, Assistant General Counsel, Bank of America, on 
behalf of the American Bankers Association). 
64 Id. (prepared statement of Jill M. Sturtevant, Assistant General Counsel, Bank of America, on behalf of 
the Ameriqm Bankers Association) (declaring ABA's backing of amendments expressly including penalty 
provisions of executory contracts or unexpired leases within exceptions to general rule). 
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erroneous subsequent court rulings that the section relieves debtors from curing all 
nonmonetary defaults in the assumption and assignment of executory contracts and 
leases. "65 It also approved of the amendments' clarifying "that nonmonetary defaults 
arising under an unexpired lease of personal property would have to be cured prior 
to such lease's assumption. "66 However, the ABA warned that it would strongly 
oppose the amendments if a provision were added allowing "real estate interests to 
seize realty leases for incurable nonmonetary defaults."67 Specifically, the ABA was 
concerned about how such a provision would affect lessee retail establishments.68 If 
there was no exception for failures to perform nonmonetary obligations in real 
estate leases, then "it would become impossible for the debtor retailer to retain or 
assign its lease. "69 Since "leases of bankrupt retailers often have substantially more 
value than their inventory," the result would be detrimental to all of the debtor's 
other creditors. 70 
Shortly after the Congressional hearings, in May 1997, the Ninth Circuit 
overturned the district court's holding in Claremont. The court held that the word . 
"penalty" in section 365(b )(2)(D) related to both "rate" and "provision." Under this 
holding, debtors wanting to assume or assign an unexpired lease or executory 
contract were relieved of any obligation to pay penalties but not of an obligation to 
cure nonmonetary, "historical" defaults. 
The House Judiciary Committee's report on H.R. 764, submitted on October 21, 
1997, amended the bill so that subsection (D) would be struck and replaced with the 
following three subsections: 
(D) the satisfaction of any penalty rate or penalty provision relating 
to a default arising from a failure to perform nonmonetary 
obligations under an executory contract or under an unexpired lease 
of real or personal property; 
(E) the satisfaction of any provision (other than a penalty rate or 
penalty provision) relating to a default arising from any failure to 
perform nonmonetary obligations under an unexpired lease of real 
property, if it is impossible for the trustee to cure such default by 
performing nonmonetary acts at and after the time of assumption; 
or 
(F) the satisfaction of any provision (other than a penalty rate or 
. penalty provision) relating to a default arising from any failure to 
65 Id. (asserting amendments do not include all nonmonetary defaults within exceptions to general rule). 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. (arguing provision not exempting nonmonetary defaults on unexpired leases on real property would 
hinder retailer's reorganization efforts and create inequity among its creditors). 
69 Id. 
10 Id. 
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perform nonmonetary obligations under an executory contract, if it 
is impossible for the trustee to cure such default by performing 
nonmonetary acts at and after the time of assumption and if the 
court determines, based on the equities of the case, that paragraph 
( 1) should not apply with respect to such default. 71 
The report made clear that subsection (D) was being replaced in response to the 
Ninth Circuit's opinion in the Claremont case. 72 Yet the report does not indicate that 
the Ninth Circuit misconstrued the subsection. In fact, the report amended 
subsection (D) to read "penalty rate or penalty provision," as suggested by the Ninth 
Circuit. 73 Nevertheless, the Committee went on to add subsections (E) and (F) to 
address incurable defaults in the contexts of unexpired real estate leases and 
executory contracts. 
This change represented the Committee's recognition of "different policy 
. considerations that are implicated in leasing arrangements and executory 
contracts."74 The Committee reasoned [as the ELA had suggested] that, for personal 
property leases, failure to perform nonmonetary obligations was an appropriate bar 
to assumption because of the potential for rapid deterioration and irreparable harm 
that nonmonetary defaults, such as failure to follow a maintenance schedule, could 
do to leased equipment.75 However, because such a potential for depreciation in 
value is absent with real estate leases, they are treated differently: 
With real estate leases, a bankruptcy trustee . . . is not to be 
required to do the impossible and cure incurable defaults before 
assumption. The debtor's estate . . . for example, should not be 
deprived of a retail lease that is a valuable asset and may be needed 
for reorganization merely because the store has conducted a going-
out-of-business sale or violated a clause against closing for a period 
oftime.76 
For executory contracts, especially franchise agreements, the Committee decided 
the fairest approach is to require all curable defaults be cured and let a bankruptcy 
judge decide whether incurable defaults should bar assumption.77 That way a judge 
can consider such factors as the trustee's ability "to meet the manufacturer's 
contractual requirements with regard to quality assurance, warranty service, and 
71 H.R. REP. No. 105-324, at 3 (1997). 
72 Id. at 12. 
73 Id. at 3. 
74 Id. at 13. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 13. 
77 Id. at 13-14. 
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trademark protection" to determine whether, based on the equities, the incurable 
default bars assumption. 78 
Finally, the Committee Report made clear that the amendment was not intended 
to prevent the non~debtor party from obtaining compensation "for actual pecuniary 
loss resulting from the debtor's incurable nonmonetary default or to obtain adequate 
assurance of future performance under such contract or lease."79 While that intent 
was clear from the legislative history, it was not clear from the location of the 
provisions. 
On November 12, 1997, the House passed the Bankruptcy Amendments of 
1997, as amended with a new version of section 365(b ). 80 In the version that passed 
the House, the carve outs for executory contracts and real property leases that had 
been in subsections (E) and (F) were moved from section 365(b)(2) to section 
365(b )(1 )(A) as subparagraphs (i) and (ii).81 Therefore, the version of H.R. 764 that 
passed in the House changed section 365(b) to read as follows: 
(b )( 1) If there has been a default in an executory contract or 
unexpired lease of the debtor, the trustee may not assume such 
contract or lease unless, at the time of assumption of such contract 
or lease, the trustee-
78 Id. at 14. 
79 Id. 
(A) cures, or provides adequate assurance that the trustee 
will promptly cure, such default other than a default that is 
a breach of a provision relating to 
(i) the satisfaction of any provision (other than a 
penalty rate or penalty provision) relating to a 
default arising from any failure to perform 
nonmonetary obligations under an unexpired lease 
of real property, if it is impossible for the trustee to 
cure such default by performing nonmonetary acts 
at and after the time of assumption; or 
(ii) the satisfaction of any provision (other than a 
penalty rate or penalty provision) relating to a 
default arising from any failure to perform 
nonmonetary obligations under an executory 
contract, if it is impossible for the trustee to cure 
such default by performing nonmonetary acts at 
80 H.R. 764 (as engrossed in House Nov. 13, 1997). 
81 Id. 
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(B) compensates, or provides adequate assurance that the 
trustee will promptly compensate, a party other than the 
debtor to such contract or lease, for any actual pecuniary 
loss to such party resulting from such default; and 
(C) provides adequate assurance of future performance 
under such contract or lease. 
(2) Paragraph ( 1) of this subsection does not apply to a default that 
is a breach of a provision relating to-
(D) the satisfaction of any penalty rate or penalty provision 
relating to a default arising from a failure to perform 
nonmonetary obligations under an executory contract or 
under an unexpired lease of real or personal property. 82 
Note that section 365(b )(1 )(B) discusses the requirement to compensate the 
non-debtor party for actual pecuniary loss, and section 365(b )(1 )(C) discusses the 
requirement to provide adequate assurance of future performance. By moving the 
exceptions to the requirement to cure nonmonetary obligations in executory 
contracts and real estate leases into section 365(b )( 1 )(A), the House intended "to 
clarify that when a trustee or debtor-in-possession is excused from curing a 
nonmonetary default under a real estate lease or executory contract as a condition to 
the assumption of the contract or lease, the creditor remains entitled to 
compensation for actual pecuniary loss resulting from the default and to adequate 
assurance of future performance. "83 That is, the requirements of section 365(b )(1) 
do not apply to defaults described in section 365(b )(2). If the exceptions for 
defaults relating to nonmonetary obligations were included in section 365(b)(2), 
then those defaults would be exempt from all of the requirements of section 
365(b )(1) (including the requirements to compensate for actual pecuniary loss and 
to provide adequate assurance of future performance), not just from the requirement 
to cure, which is found in section 365(b )(1 )(A). Since the carve-outs provided for 
defaults of nonmonetary obligations were only meant to excuse the requirement of 
cure, they were included as exceptions to the provision requiring cure: section 
365(b )(1 )(A). 
82 Id. 
83 143 CONG. REC. H 10660, 10661 (1997) (statement of Rep. Gekas). 
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This move to section 365(b)(l) from section 365(b)(2) may have also been 
prompted by other, related considerations. All the exceptions found in section 
365(b )(2) relate to ipso facto clauses in executory contracts and leases. 84 The House 
may have been clarifying that a default arising from a breach of a nonmonetary 
obligation is different in kind from any monetary penalty provision that may be 
associated with that default.85 In addition, cross-references to section 365(b )(2) 
appear in other sections of the Bankruptcy Code.86 In those sections, defaults of 
nonmonetary obligations would also be exempt from the operation of those 
provisions if the nonmonetary obligations exceptions had not been removed from 
section 365(b )(2). 
Though H.R. 764 never made it out of the Senate Subcommittee on Oversight 
and Courts, another House bill to amend the Bankruptcy Code, H.R. 3150, was 
introduced on February 3, 1998.87 When it was introduced, it contained no provision 
regarding the requirement to cure nonmonetary obligations. But on June I 0, 1998, 
the bill was amended to add section 215, which was identical to the provision that 
amended section 365(b) in H.R. 764.88 
When H.R. 3150 went to the Senate, the Senate struck everything after the 
enacting clause and inserted the language of its own bill to amend the Bankruptcy 
Code, S. 1301, which included no provision amending section 365(b ). When S. 
1301 was first introduced in the Senate on October 21, 1997, it did include a 
provision to clarify the requirement to cure nonmonetary defaults, identical to the 
first version of H.R. 764, which struck section 365(b )(2)(0) and added new 
subsections (D) and (E). However, the Senate Judiciary Committee reported to the 
Senate and proposed an amendment to S. 1301 on June 4, 1998, striking the section 
amending section 365(b)(2) without a written report.89 Therefore, the version of 
H.R. 3150 passed by the Senate-which incorporated S. 130 I-did not amend 
section 365(b ). 
A conference to resolve the differences between the House and the Senate's 
version of H.R. 3150 produced an agreement to use the provision regarding 
nonmonetary obligations that was included in the House version but with a 
parenthetical explaining that intellectual property was not excused from the 
requirement to cure.90 The Conference Report's proposed amendment to section 
84 H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 347 (1977) (describing limitations on trustee's powers imposed by section 
365(b )). 
85 Lesley A. Truitt, From the Conflicting Treatment of Nonmonetary Defaults in§ 365(b). an Exception for 
Franchises Emerges, 17 BANKR. DEV. J. 257, 270 (2000) (noting later, similarly-worded bill was intended to 
clarify "that only the penalty provision in the contract is considered ipso facto, not the nonmonetary default 
itself''). 
86 E.g., 11 U.S.C. § 11 IO(a)(l)(B) (2000) (dealing with aircraft equipment and vessels); 11 U.S.C. § 
I I 68(a)(l)(B) (2000) (applying to rolling stock equipment). 
87 H.R. 3150, 105th Cong. (1998) (as introduced in House, Feb. 3, 1998). 
88 144 CONG. REC. H4397 (1998) (indicating amendment to add section 215 agreed upon). 
89 S. 1301, 105th Cong. (1998) (as reported in Senate, June 5, 1998). 
90 See H.R. REP. No. I 05-794, at 44--45 ( 1998) (Conf. Rep.). 
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365(b)(l)(A) excluded from the requirement to cure, a default that is a breach of a 
provision relating to--
(i) the satisfaction of any provision (other than a penalty rate or 
penalty provision) relating to a default arising from any failure to 
perform nonmonetary obligations under an unexpired lease of real 
property (excluding executory contracts that transfer a right or 
interest under a filed or issued patent, copyright, trademark, trade 
dress, or trade secret), if it is impossible for the trustee to cure such 
default by performing nonmonetary acts at and after the time of 
assumption; or 
(ii) the satisfaction of any provision (other than a penalty rate or 
penalty provision) relating to a default arising from any failure to 
perform nonmonetary obligations under an executory contract, if it 
is impossible for the trustee to cure such default by performing 
nonmonetary acts at and after the time of assumption and if the 
court determines, based on the equities of the case, that paragraph 
(1) should not apply with respect to such default.91 
It also changed section 365(b )(2)(D) to exempt from the requirements of section 
365(b)(l) a default that is a breach of a provision relating to--
(D) the satisfaction of any penalty rate or penalty provision relating 
to a default arising from a failure to perform nonmonetary 
obligations under an executory contract (excluding executory 
contracts that transfer a right or interest under a filed or issued 
patent, copyright, trademark, trade dress, or trade secret) or under 
an unexpired lease ofreal or personal property.92 
No explanation was given for the new language regarding intellectual property. 
Though the conference report was considered and agreed to by the House on 
October 9, 1998,93 the Senate considered but never agreed to it. 94 
In the next session, H.R. 833 was introduced on February 24, 1999.95 It 
included the language amending section 365(b) that was contained in the 
conference report from the previous session. 96 On March 17, 1999, the House 
Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law held 
a hearing on H.R. 833. In a prepared statement, a representative from the National 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 45. 
93 144 CONG. REC. Hl0239 (1998). 
94 144 CONG. REC. S 12148 ( 1998). 
95 145 CONG. REC. H 795 ( 1999). 
96 H.R. 833, I 06th Cong. § 215 (1999). 
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Bankruptcy Conference expressed that the Conference would support the section on 
"Defaults based on nonmonetary obligations" if the language referring to 
intellectual property were deleted.97 He explained there were two reasons the 
Conference opposed the intellectual property language: 
First, it ignores the possibility that the debtor is the intellectual 
property licensor rather than the licensee. If the licensor cannot 
assume the contract, the non-debtor licensee may be deprived of 
rights, except to the extent protected under section 365(n). Second, 
if the debtor is the licensee, there is no reason why a technical 
prepetition default on a nonmonetary obligation, such as going dark 
or conducting a going out of business sale, should justify forfeiting 
the debtor's access to the intellectual property as long [as] any other 
defaults have been cured.98 
Nevertheless, the April 29, 1999 report from the House Judiciary Committee did not 
amend the bill to exclude the intellectual property language.99 The report restated all 
the reasons for amending section 365(b) that were provided in its October 21, 1997 
report on H.R. 764: in response to the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Claremont, the 
Committee concluded that while the cure of nonmonetary defaults in personal 
property leases was an appropriate bar to assumption, it is not an appropriate bar in 
real estate leases and executory contracts when the default is incurable. 100 
This report also included the "Agency Views" from the Department of Justice 
opposing the amendment to section 365(b): 
Waiving the debtor's obligations to cure if the default is not curable 
by money ignores that many defaults going to the essence of the 
agreement are not curable by money. The non-debtor party should 
not be forced to perform where deprived of the full benefit of the 
bargain. 101 
More specifically, in the case of executory contracts, the Justice Department 
opposed replacing the common law method of distinguishing minor defaults 
(entitling only damages) from major defaults (voiding the agreement) with the 
97 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999 (Part 11): Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. 
Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, I 06th Cong. 2 ( 1999) (prepared statement of Kenneth Klee, 
Professor, University of CalifomiaCLos Angeles School of Law, Los Angeles, CA, on behalf of the National 
Bankruptcy Conference) available at http://judiciary.house.gov/legacy/l 06-klee.htm. 
98 Id. 
99 See H.R. REP. No. 106-123, pt. I, at 33 (1999) (explaining amendments to section 365 of title 11). 
100 Id. at 140--41. 
101 Id. at 214. 
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"wholly novel notion of equities. 11102 The Justice Department was concerned that 
this provision-which leaves to the courts the task of determining "based on the 
equities" whether a debtor is excused form the requirement to cure-"gives no 
guidance to the judge or parties as to what factors should be weighed, and will 
therefore generate confusion and litigation. 11103 
In the final version of H.R. 833, the intellectual property language was moved 
from section 365(b )(1 )(A)(i), which pertained to real estate leases, to section 
365(b )(1 )(A)(ii), which pertained to executory contracts. 104 Under this version, 
section 365(b) excluded from the requirement to cure, a default that is a breach of a 
provision relating to-
(i) the satisfaction of any provision (other than a penalty rate or 
penalty provision) relating to a default arising from any failure to 
perform nonmonetary obligations under an unexpired lease of real 
property, if it is impossible for the trustee to cure such default by 
performing nonmonetary acts at and after the time of assumption; 
or 
(ii) the satisfaction of any provision (other than a penalty rate or 
penalty provision) relating to a default arising from any failure to 
perform nonmonetary obligations under an executory contract 
(excluding executory contracts that transfer a right or interest under 
a filed or issued patent, copyright, trademark, trade dress, or trade 
secret), if it is impossible for the trustee to cure such default by 
performing nonmonetary acts at and after the time of assumption 
and if the court determines, based on the equities of the case, that 
this subparagraph should not apply with respect to such default; 105 
When the Senate received H.R. 833, it again struck everything after the 
enacting clau-se and replaced it with its own bankruptcy bill, S. 625, which 
contained no provision amending section 365(b ). 106 The bill that passed in the 
Senate did not amend section 365(b). 
But in the next session, a bill that did contain an amendment to section 365(b) 
was introduced in the Senate. 107 Under S. 3186, section 365(b)(l)(A) was amended 
to read as follows: 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
(b )( 1) If there has been a default in an executory contract or 
unexpired lease of the debtor, the trustee may not assume such 
104 See H.R. 833, I 06th Cong. § 215 ( 1999) (as engrossed in House, May 5, 1999). 
10s Id. 
106 S. 625, I 06th Cong. ( 1999). 
107 S. 3186, I 06th Cong. § 328 (2000). 
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contract or lease unless, at the time of assumption of such contract 
or lease, the trustee-
(A) cures, or provides adequate assurance th.at the trustee 
will promptly cure, such default other than a default that is 
a breach of a provision relating to the satisfaction of any 
provision (other than a penalty rate or penalty provision) 
relating to a default arising from any failure to perform 
nonmonetary obligations under an unexpired lease of real 
property, if it is impossible for the trustee to cure such 
default by performing nonmonetary acts at and after the 
time of assumption, except that if such default arises from a 
failure to operate in accordance with a nonresidential real 
property lease, then such default shall be cured by 
performance at and after the time of assumption in 
accordance with such lease, and pecuniary losses resulting 
from such default shall be compensated in accordance with 
the provision of paragraph (b )(1); 108 
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Section 365(b)(2)(D) was also amended by striking "penalty rate or provision" 
and replacing it with "penalty rate or penalty provision. 11109 
S. 3 l 86's provision on "Defaults Based on Nonmonetary Obligations" 
represents a departure from previous bills in several respects. .first, it omits the 
intellectual property language from section 365(b )(1 )(A) and from section 
365(b )(2)(D). Second, the exception to the requirement to cure only applies to 
unexpired leases of real property and not to executory contracts or personal property 
leases. Third, "[d]ebtors are compelled to comply prospectively with all operational 
terms in nonresidential real property leases." 11° Finally, it specifies that the non-
debtor party is still entitled to compensation for actual pecuniary loss associated 
with the breach pursuant to section 365(b )(1 ). S. 3186 was approved by the Senate 
and was approved by the House as R.R. 2415,111 President Clinton pocket vetoed it 
on December 19, 2000. 
Nevertheless, the language of H.R. 2415 as passed by both houses was 
eventually adopted in the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection 
Act of 2005, which became Public Law No. 109-8 on April 20, 2005, with one 
minor exception. On July 25, 2002, the House made a final change to the language 
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
tto HON. WILLIAM HOUSTON BROWN & LAWRENCE R. AHERN Ill, 2005 BANKRUPTCY REFORM 
LEGISLATION WITH ANALYSIS, 102 (Thomson/West 2005). 
111 See 146 CONG. REC. H9826, H9840 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 2000) (House agreeing to H.R. Rep. No. 106-
970 (2000)); 146 CONG. REC. 01201, 01201 (daily ed. Dec. 7, 2000) (Senate's agreement to H.R. Rep. No. 
106-970 (2000)). 
640 AB/ LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:617 
amending section 365(b)(l)(A) by providing that pecuniary losses would be 
compensated pursuant to the provisions of "this paragraph" rather than to the 
provisions of "paragraph (b)(l)." 112 Perhaps this was because paragraph (b)(l) is 
"this" paragraph, as the provision appears in subparagraph (A) of paragraph (b)(l). 
In any event, the Conference report accompanying the change indicated it was not 
meant to be a substantive change, and "[p]ecuniary losses resulting from such 
default must be compensated pursuant to sections 365(b)(l)." 113 
III. WHY ARE WE WHERE WE ARE? 
The question of why we are where we are with respect to the bankruptcy law of 
nonmonetary defaults in unexpired leases and executory contracts can be treated as 
an "academic question" or a "real-world question." An "academic answer" can 
allude to the contract/property dichotomy in landlord tenant law' 14 and in 
bankruptcy law' 15 or opine as to role of state law in bankruptcy. 116 A "real-world" 
answer simply points to the impact of special interest lobbying on lawmaking. 117 
While we know we are right in answering this last, "real-world" question, 
courts may (and, in some instances, we hope will) find our answers to other "real-
world questions" "wrong" or decide that we were asking the wrong questions. And, 
so we borrow the following from the under-appreciated Seattle singer/songwriter 
Scott Katz118 as our concluding mea culpa: 
By way of recognition of our incorrect position 
And to gracefully unmention our incorrect contention 
That left us in the position of impressive imprecision 
We were wrong, wrong, wrong, wrong. " 9 
112 H.R. 333, I 07th Cong. § 328 (2d. 2002) (as reported to House, July 26, 2002). 
113 H.R. REP. No. 107-617, at 224 (2002). 
114 See Michael Madison, The Real Properties of Contract Law, 82 B.U. L.REV. 405, 410--26 (2002) 
(describing contract approach taken in landlord tenant law). 
115 See Blake Rohrbacher, Note, More Equal Than Others: Defending Property-Contract Parity in 
Bankruptcy, 114 YALE L. J. 1099, 1110--31 (2005) (analyzing overlap and distinctions between property and 
contract law in bankruptcy). 
116 See Thomas E. Plank, Bankruptcy and Federalism, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1063, 1075-76 (2002) 
(explaining necessary constitutional limits since Bankruptcy Code is expressly and impliedly reliant on state 
law). 
117 See Melissa B. Jacoby, The Bankruptcy Code at Twenty-Five and the Next Generation of Lawmaking, 
78 AM. BANKR. L.J. 221, 241 (2004) (discussing lobbyists impact on state bankruptcy legislation which 
serves as model for federal bankruptcy legislation). 
118 See generally http://www.yellowtailrecords.com/katz/katzreview.htm (providing additional information 
on Scott Katz's record). · 
119 SCOTT KATZ, The Wrong Song, on WRONG (Yellowtail Records 1999). 
